This book provides a theory of the logic of survival of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), one of the most resilient autocratic regimes in the twentieth century. An autocratic regime hid behind the facade of elections that were held with clockwise precision. Although their outcome was totally predictable, elections were not hollow rituals. The PRI made millions of ordinary citizens vest their interests in the survival of the autocratic regime. Voters could not simply throw the 'rascals out of office' because their choices were constrained by a series of strategic dilemmas that compelled them to support the autocrats. The book also explores the factors that led to the demise of the PRI. The theory sheds light on the logic of 'electoral autocracies', among the most common type of autocracy and is the only systematic treatment in the literature today dealing with this form of autocracy.
作者简介：
Beatriz Magaloni is an assistant professor of political science at Stanford University. She is also affiliated with the Center for Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law and the Latin American Center. She received her M.A. and Ph.D. in political science from Duke University as well as a law degree from ITAM. Her dissertation won the Gabriel Almond Award for best dissertation in comparative politics granted by the American Political Science Association. Magaloni has received Fulbright, Ford Foundation, SSRC, and Institute for the Study of World Politics grants. Articles she has written have appeared in the Journal of Theoretical Politics, Política y Gobierno and in edited volumes. |
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