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Compliance Quantified合约遵守的量化: 数据验证导论

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Compliance Quantified合约遵守的量化: 数据验证导论

最 低 价:¥366.30

定 价:¥407.00

作 者:RudolfAvenhaus 等著

出 版 社:

出版时间:2005-9-1

I S B N:9780521019194

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内容简介

International agreements, such as those governing arms control and the environment, virtually always require some degree of verification so that compliance can be established. To ensure that the verification process is regarded as efficient, effective and impartial, it is important to model it mathematically. One such model can be derived by applying methods from statistics and the theory of noncooperative games, developed in part by John Nash, who received a Nobel Prize in 1994 for his work. The methods permit the development of rational verification strategies, as well as such fundamental concepts as guaranteed probability of detection, timeliness of inspections and the deterrence of illegal activity. Here, the authors introduce the required theory gradually, in the context of specific, real-world examples. The only prerequisites are simple calculus and statistics. The book will be accessible to a broad range of scientists and nonscientists, in industrial, academic and governmental environments.

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目录

Foreword
Preface
1 A Theory of Verification
1.1 Cooperation versus Confrontation
1.2 A Ruritanian Example
 1.3 About This Book
2 Attributes Sampling
 2.1 From the Atlantic to the Urals
 2.2 One Class
  2.2.1 Systems Aspects
 2.3 Several Classes
 2.4 Counting Tanks
 2.5 The IAEA Formula
3 Variables Sampling
 3.1 Environmental Monitoring
 3.2 Data Differences and Decisions
  3.2.1 Maximum Sample Size
  3.2.2 Minimum Sample Size
  3.2.3 Realistic Sample Sizes
  3.2.4 Just When ARE Gross Defects Optimal?
 3.3 Bridging the Gap
 3.4 Ojos que no Ven, Corazon que no Siente
4 Stratified Variables Sampling
 4.1 Justifying the D-Statistic
  4.1.1 A Heuristic Test Statistic
  4.1.2 ... And Its Derivation
 4.2 The D-Statistic, Right or Wrong
5 Interim Inspection
 5.1 The Inspector who got Something for Nothing
  5.1.1 Faites vos Jeux ...
  5.1.2 ... Rien ne va plus
  5.1.3 The Matrix Game
 5.2 Unannounced Inspections
 5.3 The Waiting Game
 5.4 A Recursive Game
6 Global Sampling
 6.1 Ruritania Revisited
  6.1.1 Of Dyes and Mustard
  6.1.2 A Global Sampling Model
  6.1.3 A Numerical Example
 6.2 Technical Solutions to Political Problems
  6.2.1 Dealing with Subjectivity
  6.2.2 Deterrence
  6.2.3 The CFE Revisited
 6.3 Sampling the Globe
  6.3.1 The K+l-person Game
  6.3.2 Transformation and an Example
 6.4 Das Wort zum Sonntag
7 Material Accountancy
 7.1 Exploiting Continuity
 7.2 Sensitivity and the Price of Timeliness
  7.2.1 One Inventory Period
  7.2.2 Two Inventory Periods
  7.2.3 Lots of Inventory Periods
 7.3 Timely Detection
  7.3.1 Independently Transformed MUFs
  7.3.2 In the Limit
  7.3.3 A Simple Sequential Test
  7.3.4 A CUSUM Test
8 Accountancy Verification
 8.1 A Simple Model
 8.2 One Inventory Period
 8.3 Sequence of Inventory Periods
9 Inspector Leadership
 9.1 Honesty is the Best Policy
  9.1.1 After You, Farmer Hatfield
 ……
Appendix
Bibliography
Index

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