| Tables and Figure Preface 1 Introduction 1.1 Evidence from Historical Records: Individual-Level Data and Analysis 1.2 Organization of the Book 2 Institutional Background 2.1 Organization of the Federal Reserve System 2.2 Decision-Making Processes within the FOMC 2.3 Monetary Policy Operating Procedures 2.4 Conclusions 3 Analytical Background 3.1 Political Business Cycles 3.2 The Federal Reserve as a Bureaucracy 3.3 The Theory of the Time Inconsistency Problem 3.4 Committee Reaction Function Studies 3.5 Analysis of FOMC Voting Records 3.6 Conclusions 4 A Long History of FOMC Voting Behavior: Individual Reaction Functions and Political Influence on the Monetary Policy Decision Process 4.1 A Model of FOMC Decision Making 4.2 Data Considerations 4.3 Empirical Results: Individual FOMC Members 4.4 Political Influences on the Monetary Policy Decision Process 4.5 Conclusions 5 Data from the Memoranda of Discussion and FOMC Transcripts 5.1 Data from the Textual Records of FOMC Meetings 5.2 Coding FOMC Members' Monetary Policy Preferences: The Burns Years 5.3 Coding FOMC Members' Monetary Policy Preferences: The Greenspan Years 5.4 Conclusions 6 Estimating Reaction Functions for Individual FOMC Members 6.1 Individual Reaction Functions 6.2 Individual Reaction Function Estimates: The Bums Era 6.3 Bums Era Econometric Results in Historical Perspective 6.4 Individual Reaction Function Estimates: The Greenspan Era 6.5 Greenspan Era Econometric Results in Historical Perspective 6.6 Conclusions 7 Majority Rule, Consensus Building, and the Power of the Chairman: Arthur Burns and the FOMC 7.1 The Power of the Chairman and the Allure of Consensus 7.2 Constructing Preference Profiles for the FOMC 7.3 FOMC Decision Making: Empirical Models 7.4 FOMC Decision Making: Empirical Results 7.5 FOMC Decision Making: Extensions 7.6 Conclusions 8 FOMC Decisions during the Greenspan Years 8.1 Greenspan's Influence on the Committee 8.2 The Committee's Influence on Greenspan 8.3 Sources of Greenspan's Influence 8.4 Conclusions 9 Political Influences on Monetary Policy Decision Making:Evidence from the Memoranda and the Transcripts 10 Time Inconsistency and the Great Inflation:Evidence from the Memoranda and the Transcripts 11 Conclusions References Index |
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